RESOLUÇÃO GECEX Nº 798, DE 29 DE SETEMBRO DE 2025 (parte 7 de 16)

252. A propósito, é importante recordar que de acordo com o próprio DECOM
148. (...) a variedade e o nível de concessão de subsídios, em conjunto com
outras formas de intervenção governamental, poderão resultar em tamanho grau de
distorção dos incentivos que, no limite, acabam fazendo com que deixem de prevalecer
condições de economia de mercado em determinado segmento.
149. De fato, todos os dados apontam para um alto nível de concessão de
subsídios do setor siderúrgico chinês. 150. Com base em dado extraído do Integrated Trade
Intelligence Portal (I-TIP) da OMC, referente aos códigos SH 72 e 73, foram iniciadas 78
investigações de subsídios sobre as importações chinesas de aço até 2020, sendo todas elas
iniciadas depois de 2007.
253. Embora a petição em tela não diga respeito a subsídios, a peticionária disse
entender que a referência ao elevado número de investigações da espécie é relevante, pois,
analisada em conjunto com os demais elementos de prova apresentados, demonstram de
forma cristalina o elevado grau de interferência do governo chinês no setor siderúrgico.
254. Sobre a estrutura de mercado e o controle estatal, o DECOM, na
mencionada Circular SECEX nº 10, em alusão ao relatório da OCDE anteriormente citado,
afirma:
101. De acordo com o mesmo estudo, os governos teriam vários motivos para
intervir no setor siderúrgicos, que muitas vezes é considerado estratégico, uma vez que
serviriam a propósitos de desenvolvimento industrial ou mesmo de defesa nacional.
102. (...) a definição de empresas estatais (SOEs - State Owned Entrprises) é
complexa, porque envolve determinar o grau de controle que o estado pode exercer sobre
uma empresa. (...).
103. Ademais, mesmo na ausência de controle estatal, os regulamentos ou a
presença nos órgãos de governança da empresa podem fornecer margem suficiente para o
Estado influenciar o processo de tomada de decisão.
255. O sistema financeiro chinês é caracterizado por dois fatores: a forte
presença de state owned banks e a influência disseminada do estado que impõe sobre esse
sistema diversos objetivos, em particular relacionados à implementação de um sofisticado
sistema de planejamento econômico, de forma que, segundo o Documento de Trabalho
Europeu:
Overall, the functioning of the entire financial system is characterized by high
State presence on both borrowing and lending side, as well as by the absence of normal
market mechanisms such as effective and transparent bankruptcy and market exit
procedures.
256. Ainda de acordo com o Documento, a propósito da relação entre o sistema
financeiro e o setor siderúrgico é necessário considerar que:
The government control over banks has a direct influence on the manner in
which loans, credits and access to finance in general, is provided to steel producers. It is
therefore the government's control over the financial sector that, inter alia, has created the
so-called 'zombie companies' and therefore, played a major role in the severe overcapacity
problem to which China is the main contributor globally.
257. Especificamente a propósito do setor siderúrgico, de início o Documento de
Trabalho Europeu lista diversos documentos que detalham a extensão da intervenção e do
controle exercido sobre o setor siderúrgico. São eles:
• the 14th FYP,
• the 14th Raw Materials FYP (or also the 'Plan' in this Chapter),
• the Guiding Opinion on Promoting High-Quality Development of the Iron and
Steel Industry ('Steel Industry Development GO'),
• various implementing and guiding documents related to steel, in particular the
2023 Work Plan on the Stable Growth of the Steel Industry, the Plan for Adjusting and
Upgrading the Steel Industry, as well as previous measures guiding the development of the
steel industry and those addressing overcapacity problems.
258. Os objetivos estabelecidos pelo 14º Plano Quinquenal podem ser
resumidos da seguinte forma, conforme o Documento Europeu:
The 14 th FYP sets out some general objectives regarding the steel industry, with
emphasis on the development of high-end new materials and the greening of the steel
sector. Among other priorities, the plan aims at accelerating the development of the
industrial system and consolidating the foundation of the real economy. This includes
optimization and structural adjustments of the steel industry, as well as promoting
breakthroughs in advanced metals, including high-quality special steels.
259. O 14º Plano Quinquenal não informa metas específicas para o setor
siderúrgico, as quais foram incorporadas ao 14º Plano Quinquenal para matérias primas,
que cobre diversos setores, de forma que
the Plan states that it was "formulated in order to implement the [14th FYP] and
improve the development quality and profitability of the raw materials industry".
Complementing the Plan, MIIT, together with NDRC and MEE, issued, in January 2022, the
Steel Industry Development GO [nota de rodapé omitida] which set additional quantitative
targets. Since the stated purpose of the Steel Industry Development GO is to implement the
14th FYP and the 14th Raw Materials FYP [nota de rodapé omitida], it is appropriate to
examine the Plan and the Steel Industry Development GO together, as they give top-level
guidance for the development of the steel sector from multiple angles.
260. A propósito do excesso de capacidade instalada no setor siderúrgico na
China, o Documento de Trabalho Europeu esclarece:
Since decades, the Chinese steel sector has been characterised by massive
overcapacity, a fact acknowledged in various official planning documents. The Chinese
authorities have unsuccessfully tried to solve this problem. An essential factor which makes
resolving the overcapacity issue difficult is the misalignment of local and national goals.
Local governments want to maximize employment and tax revenue and avoid the massive
hit to employment that would come from closing down steel mills. Because some steel
producers were owned by local and provincial governments, it has been complicated for the
Government to compel reductions. The failure to solve the overcapacity is also due to the
authorities pursuing additional objectives, such as to create national champions able to
compete internationally.
261. Especificamente a propósito do grupo Baowu, do qual faz parte a TISCO
Stainless Steel Industrial Co., Limited, o Documento afirma:
The objectives spelled out in the Plan and the Steel Industry Development GO are
indeed implemented in practice, as the following example shows. On 22 September 2022,
strategic cooperation agreements were signed between the Shanghai Government and
China Baowu Iron and Steel Group Co., Ltd. The objective of these agreements is to optimize
policy supply, create a first-class business environment, help China Baowu become better
and stronger in Shanghai, and become a global industry leader1[nota de rodapé omitida].
Similarly, in his speech given at the occasion of the signature of a strategic cooperation
framework agreement between Jiangxi Provincial Government and Baowu in November
2022, the Baowu's Secretary of Party Committee and Chairman pointed out that Baowu was
vigorously promoting the construction of a world-class great enterprise in accordance with
the spirit of the 20th CCP Congress (see Section 2.2.4) and the spirit of President Xi's
important instructions1 [nota de rodapé omitida]. To be noted in this connection that the
report of the 20th CCP Congress emphasized the focus of the economic development as one
which should be placed on the real economy, speeding up the construction of a strong
manufacturing country, promoting state-owned capital and state-owned enterprises to
become stronger, better and bigger, and enhance the core competitiveness of enterprises.
262. O Baowu Group faz parte de uma extensa lista de empresas state-owned,
conforme informação obtida no sítio eletrônico da State-owned Assets Supervision and
Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC). Além disso, conforme consta da
Circular SECEX nº 10, de 2024, o presidente do Baowu Group, Sr. Dai Zhihao, é um membro
permanente do Comitê do Partido Comunista Chinês.
263. Em relação às metas e objetivos do 14º Plano Quinquenal traduzidas em
metas específicas em planos provinciais e/ou municipais, o Documento de Trabalho
Europeu apresenta três exemplos, relativos às províncias de Shandong, Jiangsu e Hebei,
selecionadas porque representam as principais províncias onde se localizam indústrias
siderúrgicas:
The 14th FYP (2021-25) on Developing Steel Industry in Shandong Province (the
'14th Shandong FYP on Steel') [nota de rodapé omitida] commits the province to "strive to
build a steel industry ecology, further optimize the steel industry's layout, further adjust its
structure, further consolidate its foundation and further extend its industry chain, and
deepen further the integration of the steel industry with the equipment manufacturing
industry so as to double the output value of steel and its related products to trillion-scale"
[nota de rodapé omitida] during the period of the plan's validity. In that regard, the main
development objectives in the 14th Shandong FYP on Steel include:
• Increasing the income of main businesses by 10% annually, increasing the
proportion of short-process steelmaking to about 20%, and doubling the labour productivity
of steel enterprises to 1,500 tons per person per year [nota de rodapé omitida]
• Exceeding one trillion RMB in the total output value of the steel smelting,
rolling, deep processing and distribution industry by 2025 (wherein high-end and high-
quality steel shall account for around 50%, high quality deep processing 25%, and the use of
scrap steel as raw material 30% of the output value)[nota de rodapé omitida]. Increasing
R&D in steel products to over 3% of the business income [nota de rodapé omitida].
• Creating ten enterprise tech centers at provincial-level and two to three at
national level and making breakthroughs in three to five key steel materials yearly [nota de
rodapé omitida].
• As regards industrial layout, the proportion of steel production capacity in the
Dongjiakou port of Qingdao, the Lanshan district in Rizhao, the Lingang economic
development zone of Linyi, and other coastal areas shall be increased to more than 70%,
whereas cities such as Jinan, Zibo, Liaocheng, Binzhou, Weifang and those along the
Qingdao-Jinan route shall cut their production as much as possible[nota de rodapé
omitida].
• Finally, the industry's overall energy and water consumption per ton of steel is
to decrease below 535 kg of standard coal and 2.85 cubic meters of water, respectively: "The
total energy consumption and intensity will be reduced by more than 5%, the water
consumption intensity by more than 10%, and the reuse rate of water to more than 98%."
The second example, Jiangsu Work Plan for Layout Optimization in the
Transformation and Upgrading of the Steel Industry Throughout the Province (the 'Jiangsu
Steel Industry Work Plan') [nota de rodapé omitida], was released by the Government of
Jiangsu in 2019. With Jiangsu being China's second biggest steel producing province, the
Jiangsu Steel Industry Work Plan was issued well before the 14th Raw Materials FYP.
Therefore, the Jiangsu Steel Industry Work Plan formally does not implement the 14th Raw
Materials FYP but is rather inspired by the 19th CCP Congress (see Section 2.2.4) and
President Xi's speech on the development of the Yangtze River economic belt and it
implements the Notice of General Office of Provincial Party Committee and General Office of
Provincial Government on Issuing the Implementation Opinions on Accelerating the
Transformation, Upgrading and High-quality Development of Province's Chemical, Iron,
Steel, Coal and Power Industry (document no 2018/32) [nota de rodapé omitida]. The
Jiangsu Steel Industry Work Plan sets several goals regarding the industrial layout,
concentration and emissions.
• Optimizing the ratio of steel smelting capacity along the Yangtze River and
coastal areas from the existing 7:3 to 5:5 by 2025 [nota de rodapé omitida].
• Enhancing agglomeration in the industry, striving to reduce the number of iron
and steel enterprises in the province from 45 to about 20 while also enhancing the
production capacity of the top five enterprises to account for 70% of province's steel output
by 2020 [nota de rodapé omitida].
• Cutting the total emission of sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxide and particulate
matter in the province's steel industry by 30%, 50% and 50% respectively by 2020 [nota de
rodapé omitida].
• Integrating the decentralized smelting enterprises in the Xuzhou region with
steel production below 2 million tonnes towards the cluster of leading enterprises [nota de
rodapé omitida].
• The plan further specifies that "in principle, all relocation and capacity merger
and acquisition projects in the province are only allowed to be implemented in coastal áreas'
[nota de rodapé omitida].
• To attain these objectives, all relevant departments in the province are
required to "study and introduce more supportive policies in terms of capital, taxation,
finance, land, personnel resettlement and debt disposal"
Finally, the third example examined here is the Three-Year Action Plan for Cluster
Development of Steel Industry Chain in Hebei Province ('Hebei Three-Year Action Plan') [nota
de rodapé omitida], the province with the largest steel production in China. This plan was
adopted for the period 2020-2022, before the start of the 14th planning cycle, but reflects
the same objectives found in the central-level 14th FYPs. Some examples of objectives in the
Hebei Three-Year Action Plan include:
• Constructing a batch of demonstration blast furnaces and converters with a
plant size of 3 000m³ and production capacity of 200 tonnes and above by the end of
2022.
• Supporting and safeguarding downstream industry upgrading, with the share
of ordinary low-alloy steel and alloy steel to reach 25% by the end of 2022.
• Accelerating the process of mergers and restructuring to build a large, world-
class conglomerate, with the prospect of top 10 producers reaching 65% of the total output
by the end of 2022. Efforts were also to be made to set up one or two world-class large
groups, three to five powerful regional groups and eight to ten high-end niche enterprise
groups.
• In the ambit of optimizing the industrial layout, three relocation projects
(involving Shisteel, Laoting and Taihang) were set to have been completed and become
operational in 2020. Xuansteel's production capacity was to be closed own in 2021, and the
relocation project for the urban steel plant was to be completed in all essential respects in
the course of 2022. Furthermore, the province was to focus on building the two major
industrial clusters in Qian'an and Wu'an and to promote steady increases in iron and steel
production capacity along the ports and railways, focusing on the construction of four high-
quality steel production bases in the ports of Caofeidian and Jingtang (Laoting County),
Fengnan Coastal Industrial Zone and Bohai New District.
• When it comes to greening of steel production, by 2020, the utilisation and
disposal rate of solid wastes such as steel slag, blast furnace slag and sludge was set to
reach 100%. By 2022, industrial fugitive emissions were to be greatly reduced, while energy
consumption per tonne of steel was to be reduced to below 560 kg of standard coal.
Measures foreseen to ensure attaining these goals included:
• preferential tax policies (e.g. for company merger and reorganisation, for
industrial surplus power generation, for comprehensive utilisation of resources, as well as
pre-tax deduction of R&D costs, and export refunds),
• active provision of credit support,
• adjusting the land use and urban and rural planning to support the relocation,
transformation and development of urban enterprises,
• improving and supervising incentive mechanisms in order to promote
differentiated electricity pricing, water pricing and production outage and limitation policies
to encourage enterprises to move towards green, smart, high-end production."
264. Após analisar esses exemplos, impõe-se, no entendimento da
peticionária, concluir pela intervenção articulada nos diversos níveis de governo na
economia (nacional, provincial e municipal). Em outras palavras:
The above clearly shows that the goals and objectives of provincial-level
planning are closely aligned with the objectives of central-level plans for the 14th FYP
period even though in the case of Jiangsu and Hebei provinces, their Work Plan and
Action Plan were released already during 13th planning cycle. The plans describe in
detail the velopment objectives the steel industry should follow, most importantly in
terms of capacity and layout optimization. All this evidence points to the existence of
a high degree of government intervention into the sector. The provisions of these
provincial plans are an example of the extremely limited space left to the market to
shape the steel sector." According to Steel Industry Development GO, the steel industry
is the key field that contributes to green and low-carbon development in general. The
document identifies unfledged green and low carbon development as one of the major
challenges in the 14th FYP period. Several goals and policies are thus laid out to
deepen green and low-carbon development of the steel industry (...) (...) In an economy
based on market forces, a number of these actions would be carried out by private
companies. In China, instead, the authorities do not limit themselves to setting the
regulatory framework and/or promoting these actions but are the main actor in
realising them.
265. A interferência do governo chinês também alcança a sucata:
The Scrap Steel FYP shows that the Chinese authorities play an active and
intrusive role in the development of scrap steel resources. This could be considered as
part of their efforts to ensure green development for the steel industry.
266. Especialmente no caso do setor siderúrgico, as SOEs têm um papel
muito relevante, pois nesse setor, em termos de capacidade de produção ou
capacidade instalada, cerca de 60% das empresas são SOEs e 40% privadas.
267. Ao analisar as SOEs, o Documento de Trabalho Europeu também
confirma conclusão anteriormente apresentada pela autoridade investigadora brasileira
a propósito da saúde financeira, no setor siderúrgico, das SOEs em comparação com
as empresas privadas:
When it comes to the performance and efficiency of the steel SOEs,
according to an OECD study[nota de rodapé omitida], Chinese steel SOEs tend to exhibit
poorer financial performance compared to privately-owned enterprises ('POEs'). At the
same time, Chinese SOEs received more subsidies per metric tonne compared to their
private counterparts. Amongst SOEs, larger enterprises tend to receive more subsidies
compared to smaller ones. This illustrates the consolidation efforts of the Chinese
authorities and demonstrates that the Government is favouring larger SOEs in order to
create world-class steel conglomerates (see Section 14.1.2). SOEs were also more likely
than POEs to leverage important subsidy amounts to create new capacity. Subsidisation
therefore led to an increase of the Chinese steelmaking capacity and only aggravated
the already significant overcapacity problem.
268. Considerando, assim, o grau de intervenção governamental no setor
siderúrgico associado à elevada participação das SOEs neste setor, seria possível
perceber que mesmo as empresas privadas, de fato, não operam em condições de
economia de mercado.
269. Em resumo, a partir da análise empreendida pelo Documento de
Trabalho Europeu, poder-se-ia concluir que o setor siderúrgico continua a ser um pilar
para o governo chinês, o que seria confirmado por diversos planos, diretivas e outros
documentos focados no aço, a nível nacional, regional ou municipal.
The government guides the development of the sector in accordance with a
broad range of policy tools and directives related, inter alia, to market composition and
restructuring, raw materials, investment, capacity elimination, product range, relocation,
upgrading etc. Through these and other means, the government directs and controls
virtually every aspect in the development and functioning of the sector (see Section
14.1). For the last several decades Chinese policies have been to support the rise of
'national champions' in the steel industry. To accomplish this, the Chinese authorities
have employed an elaborate set of financial and other subsidies for the sector and
engineered strategic mergers that consolidated the industry players. In this respect,
SOEs are a key instrument through which the government continues to develop the
steel sector, not least by promoting the creation of ever-larger steel producers. This is
achieved through policies intended to shape the structure of the market, e.g. through
mergers and regulation of market access. In addition, Chinese financial institutions play
a key role in implementing the government's policies in the steel sector. They provide
access to finance following the government's direction and implementing the
government's policy objectives (see Section 14.3). These elements combined present a
picture of a sector heavily influenced by the government. In this regard, numerous trade
defence investigations in various jurisdictions have confirmed that Chinese steel
producers benefit from a wide array of State support measures and other market
distortive practices such as export restrictions affecting raw materials and inputs (see
Sections 14.4 and 14.5). The overarching control of the government prevents free
market forces from prevailing in the steel sector in China. The problem of overcapacity
is arguably the clearest illustration of the implications of the government's policies and
the distortions resulting therefrom. Overcapacity built up by China over years triggered
a surge of low-priced Chinese exports causing a depression of steel prices globally and
having a negative impact on, inter alia, the financial situation of steel producers
worldwide. While the government has committed to addressing the overcapacity
problem, in particular through the 14th Raw Materials FYP and the Steel Industry
Development GO, it remains to be seen whether this and other targets for the sector
are successfully met, given in particular that (i) during the 14th planning cycle, the
declared objectives for the steel sector appear contradictory as far as overcapacity
reduction is concerned [nota de rodapé omitida] and (ii) following China's departure
from GFSEC, it became very difficult to get any accurate information related to the
reduction of overcapacity in China (see Section 14.6).
270. Finalmente, a peticionária passou à análise do documento
WT/TPR/S/415/Rev.1, da OMC, que trata do exame de políticas comerciais da China.
Esse documento aduz que não houve mudanças na legislação que trata de controle de
preços:
3.3.4.2 Price controls
3.190. There were no changes to the legislation concerning price controls
during the review period. Article 18 of the Price Law163 authorizes the competent
authorities to carry out, when necessary, price controls over: (i) products that have a
significant bearing on the national economy and people's livelihoods; (ii) a limited
number of rare products; (iii) products of natural monopoly; (iv) key public utilities; and
(v) key public services. Laws and regulations on specific industrial/service sectors may
also contain provisions on price administration that reaffirm that relevant business
operators or service providers should follow the principles and rules set out by the Price
Law. These laws and regulations include, inter alia, the Pharmaceutical Administration
Law, the Railway Law, the Postal Law, the Compulsory Education Law, the Notary Law,
the Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on the
Administration of Judicial Authentication, the Civil Aviation Law, and the Commercial
Bank Law. Laws and regulations related to price controls are summarized in Table 3.20.
3.191. Price controls take two forms: "government-set prices" or "government-guided
prices". Government-set prices are fixed prices set by the competent authorities, while
government-guided prices are prices set by business operators within a range of prices
set by the competent pricing departments or other related government departments,
within which the real price is allowed to fluctuate. The determination of government-
set prices or government-guided prices varies according to the type of product or
service. Consideration is usually given to the market situation and average social costs,
as well as economic, regional, and seasonal factors, and development and social
needs.
271. O supramencionado documento da OMC não informa alterações
significativas no que diz respeito a esse segmento produtivo. Não obstante, traz informações
relevantes para a análise do caso:
2. The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020 had a major impact
on output and employment. At the beginning of 2020, China's economy contracted by
6.8%.
(...)
1.6 The COVID-19 pandemic has posed na unprecedented shock to China's
economy. Besides inflicting human costs, it has had a major impact on output, trade and
employment. At the beginning of 2020, economic growth fell to its lowest level in 40 years.
(...)
3.127. Given the importance of the Chinese economy and the size of
government support accorded to individual companies, China's support measures are
reported to be suscetible to affect global markets, downstream industries, and
individual value chains. Succh effects of China's support cannot be quantified in general,
as relevant data are not publicly available.
272. Quanto à propriedade das empresas, o documento em questão
afirma:
3.199 In China's economy, state ownership of companies is importante and
coexists with diverse forms of private ownership. State participation varies from wholly
SOEs and majority state ownership to the State acting as another shareholder.
(...)
3.202. The State-Owned Asset Supervision and Administration (SASAC) is in
charge of contributing capital to, and appointing top managers in SOEs under its
management. It acts as a representative of the Government and is directly subordinated
to the State Concil. (...)
3.203. The legal status of SOEs varies from fully Government-owned entities
to stock companies with the State or states agencies as the dominant stockholder.
Hence, manu large and formally private companies that may even be traded on the
stock market have the State as an importante of major shareholder (...).
273. Além da conhecida influência do estado, através de mecanismos
complexos e pouco transparentes, conforme afirmado, seria importante considerar:
4.92. China is the world's largest producer of industrial goods. In 2018, with a
total value-added amounting to some USD 4 trillion, the Chinese manufacturing sector
accounted for 28% of global manufacturing output. [nota de rodapé omitida]. The sector is an
important driver of China's economy. (...) 4.94. A number of policy initiatives remain in force
to address the challenges facing manufacturing activities and further develop the sector.
274. Em conclusão, a peticionária volta a citar o Documento de Trabalho Europeu:
In practice, the socialist market economy system has meant that while
market forces have been mobilised to some degree, the decisive role of the State
remains intact, with tight interconnections between government and enterprises. The
basic features of the socialist market economy are dominant state-ownership, an
extensive and sophisticated economic planning system, as well as interventionist
industrial policies and a broad array of other tools to pursue political and economic
objectives set by the Party and/or the Government. This system does not prioritise and
often does not result in market-based resource allocations. Indeed, the concept of
socialist market economy prioritises other objectives - such as 'socialist modernization'.
"Giving play to decisive role of market forces", a phrase often found in Chinese policy
documents, remains only an incidental means for achieving those objectives, with the
market forces tolerated where suitable rather than being considered the main
organising principle of the national economy.
275. De acordo com a peticionária, considerando que a "economia da China
deverá crescer 5,4% este ano, graças a uma 'forte' recuperação após a pandemia de
Covid-19", conforme afirmou o Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI) recentemente,
revisando para cima uma projeção anterior de avanço de 5%, isso, muito
provavelmente, deverá se refletir no aumento das exportações.
5.1.2.1.3 Da análise sobre o tratamento da China para apuração do valor normal
276. Ressalta-se, inicialmente, que o objetivo desta análise não é apresentar um
entendimento amplo a respeito do status da China como uma economia predominantemente
de mercado ou não. Trata-se de decisão sobre utilização de metodologia de apuração da
margem de dumping que não se baseie em uma comparação estrita com os preços ou os
custos domésticos chineses, estritamente no âmbito desta investigação.
277. Cumpre destacar que a complexa análise acerca da prevalência de
condições de economia de mercado no segmento produtivo chinês objeto da revisão
possui lastro no próprio Protocolo de Acessão da China à OMC. Com a expiração do
item 15(a)(ii) do referido Protocolo, o tratamento automático de não economia de
mercado antes conferido aos produtores/exportadores chineses investigados cessou.
Desde então, em cada caso concreto, é necessário que as partes interessadas
apresentem elementos suficientes, nos termos do restante do item 15(a), para avaliar,
na determinação de comparabilidade de preços, se i) serão utilizados os preços e os
custos chineses correspondentes ao segmento produtivo objeto da revisão ou se ii)
será adotada uma metodologia alternativa que não se baseie em uma comparação
estrita com os preços ou os custos domésticos chineses.