CIRCULAR Nº 76, DE 18 DE DEZEMBRO DE 2024 (parte 8 de 11)

"However, in parallel with these trade promotion measures, the Vietnamese
government has enacted policies to protect the relatively weak local auto firms from
international competition. For example, Decision No. 46/2001/QD-TTG, issued on 4 April
2001, prohibited the import of used parts and used under-16-seaters. New under-16-
seaters could be imported only with special permission from the Ministry of Trade of the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam (2001). The protective nature of Vietnamese government
policy continued even after Viet Nam joined the World Trade Organisation in 2007. For
example, import tariffs for automobiles remained high at an average of 70% in 2014 (Le,
2019: 4). With the accession of Viet Nam to the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement in 2015,
import tariffs were removed, but the Vietnamese government took countermeasures such
as Decree 116/2017, which 'has tightened controls for imported automobiles in terms of
origin, types, technical safety, and environment protection requirements' (Vietnam
Investment Review, 2018). More specifically, according to Decree 116/2017, 'automobile
importers will have to submit a number of dossiers, such as the registration certificates of
imported cars for technical safety and security, and environmental inspection, certified
copies of the types of tires, rear-view mirrors, and front lights issued by competent
agencies or organizations, and the original certificates of automobile quality inspection
issued by foreign automakers or automobile-assembling enterprises for each type of car'
(Vietnam Investment Review, 2018). According to a Japan External Trade Organization
(JETRO) report, '[t]he Decree 116 lists strict conditions that are virtually impossible to
meet' (JETRO, 2018). Although Decree 116 was modified in 2020 with the additional
issuance of Decree No. 17/2020/ND-CP, which relaxed some of the measures presented in
Decree 116, the Vietnamese government continues to protect the nurturing of the
domestic automobile industry (MarkLines, 2019)". (grifo nosso)
253. Ainda, as previsões da "Estratégia de Desenvolvimento Industrial até 2025,
Visão até 2035", instituída pela Decisão nº 879/QD-TTg, apontada no item anterior, visam
a incentivar o desenvolvimento de uma indústria robusta, por meio do estabelecimento de
prioridades e diretrizes para diferentes segmentos industriais, dentre eles, o automotivo, o
petroquímico e de borrachas. Uma das metas estipuladas é estimular, até 2025, as
chamadas "indústrias auxiliares", que atuam em favor do setor de manufaturas. O
apêndice da Decisão apresenta tabela com a coluna Priority industrial fields through 2025,
a qual aponta os seguintes setores:
(1) Machinery and equipment serving agriculture, (2) Shipbuilding, (3)
Automobiles and mechanical spare parts, (4) Steel for manufacturing, (5) Petro-chemistry,
(6) Technical plastics - rubber, (7) Pharmaceutical Chemistry (antibiotics, adjuvants and
vitamins), (8) Agricultural, forestry and fishery product processing, (9) Raw and auxiliary
materials for the garments, textile, leather and footwear products for export. (grifo
nosso)
254. Ainda, além das políticas focalizadas na cadeia automotiva, há diretrizes
governamentais para o setor da borracha, umas das principais matérias-primas do setor de
pneus de moto. Vietnam Rubber Association et all. sintetizam as políticas públicas relativas
à indústria da borracha:
"Recognizing rubber's potential contribution to economic development, the
Vietnamese Government, beginning in 1975, enacted various policies to expand the
country's rubber area (summarized in Table 2). In general, these policies encourage
investment in rubber production to meet the increasing demand of export markets and
have enabled the expansion of rubber area in excess of the Government's original plans.
Significantly, policies to catalyze rubber production in the late 2010s allow for planting
rubber in forest land, which has further enabled a rapid production increase - and also
enabled the involvement of smallholders. Yet this development has, especially in the
Central Highlands, negatively impacted forest resources (To Xuan Phuc and Tran Huu Nghi,
2013).
Global rubber prices fell sharply since 2012, while rubber output continued to
increase due to the expansion of rubber production area. This required the Government to
change its policy orientation. The Government's policies after 2016 mainly focused on
controlling the expansion of Vietnam's rubber area, especially those which were not
included in the planning and limiting of conversion of natural forest land to rubber
plantation land (191 / TB-VPCP on July 22, 2016). These policies, combined with the decline
in global rubber prices, caused a loss in the drive to expand area. Farmers in some places
even decided to convert part of their rubber-growing areas to other crops that have higher
economic value". (grifo nosso)
255. Entre os documentos apresentados, há menção a 15 medidas
governamentais relativas à indústria da borracha, com destaque para (a) Vietnam's rubber
industry master plan, em fevereiro de 1996 e (b) Rubber development planning to 2015,
with a vision to 2020, em junho de 2009 67, sendo este último um plano quinquenal
setorial, análogo àquele que observado para a cadeia automotiva.
256. Na mesma toada, a Organização para a Cooperação e Desenvolvimento
Econômico (OCDE) aponta que a borracha é um dos treze produtos agrícolas e florestais
elegíveis a medidas de fomento preferencial:
"In December 2018, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD)
issued a list of 13 key national products, which includes rice, coffee, rubber, cashews,
pepper, tea, vegetables and fruits, cassava and products thereof, pig meat, poultry meat
and eggs. The 13 products are eligible for preferential support measures, including
exemptions from or reductions in land or water surface rents; preferential credit; support
for the transfer and the application of high-technology in agriculture, human resources
training, and market development and promotion activities; and support for investments in
facilities and equipment for processing or preserving agricultural products". (grifo nosso)
257. No mesmo documento, há indicação ainda que os preços recebidos pelos
produtores de borracha natural são implicitamente taxados: "Producers of export
commodities such as natural rubber, coffee, cashew nuts and tea are implicitly taxed, in
that they receive prices for their outputs that are lower than world prices".
258. Ainda sobre o setor de borracha, cabe ressaltar que o Vietnã pode
produzir anualmente 1,3 milhão de t de látex, mas os processadores domésticos de
borracha só necessitam de cerca de 300 mil t.
259. Ademais, registra-se que a Vietnam Rubber Group (VRG) é a maior
produtora de borracha do Vietnã 70, em que o Governo do Vietnã tem participação de
96,7%.
260. Cabe também destacar que a VRG fez parceria com a Casumina em 2017
e manifestou interesse em aumentar o envolvimento na indústria de pneus:
"Specifically, Vietnam Rubber Group says its plans include expanding tyre and
tube. The company entered the tyre manufacturing business in 2017 through a partnership
with the Southern Rubber Industry Joint Stock Co. to produce the VRG brand of tyres.
Currently the company is mostly focused on growing rubber trees and processing latex, and
rubber wood, making industrial products from rubber, operating industrial parks amid
rubber plantations, and high-tech agriculture.
In the natural rubber segment, Vietnam Rubber Group manages more than
400,000 ha of rubber trees, but this business has been on a downward trend in recent
years due to low rubber prices." (grifo nosso)
261. O relatório do USDoC destaca que:
"The agriculture and agri-business sector has high levels of state ownership,
including all stages of agricultural production, with rice, coffee, and food processing
industries having particularly high levels of state ownership. The largest agriculture and
agri-food companies under the control of the Commission for the Management of State
Capital are: Vietnam Rubber Group (VRG), Vietnam National Coffee Corporation (Vinacafe),
Vietnam Northern Food Corporation (Vinafood-North), Vietnam Southern Food Corporation
(Vinafood-South), and Vietnam Forestry Corporation (Vinador). Most of these companies
have many companies under them. Many of these companies are export-oriented, and
together they pursue government objectives of revenue generation, employment, and
other economic, socioeconomic, and political goals of the GOVN.
For example, VRG has pursued the government objective of government
revenue generation and developing the industry. Concerning VRG, an article on a GOVN
news agency website states: "{a}s one of the backbones of Vietnam's agricultural industry,
rubber has been the focus of the government and related stakeholders. Like other
industries, the promotion as a national brand is meant to further push the crucial role the
industry has for the country". (grifo nosso)
262. Em outro trecho, o mesmo relatório ressalta que:
"Many SOEs, whether equitized or not, state on their company websites that
they aim to fulfill the objectives of the government plans that are assigned to them. For
example, Vietnam Rubber Group's 2019 Annual Report states that its focus for the next
five years is 'to ensure the best fulfillment of its 2016-2020 plan that has been approved
by the Prime Minister.' Similarly, the development plans of Vietnam National Chemical
Group (Vinachem) for 2018 and 2019 mention compliance with GOVN industrial plans,
including the 2016-2020 SEDP [Socio-Economic Development Plan]. An article on
PetroVietnam's website states that its primary goal was to 'make its best efforts to over-
fulfill all targets and plans as assigned by the Government'". (grifo nosso)
263. Com base nos elementos apresentados, observa-se que a VRG atende
prioritariamente aos objetivos governamentais, que não necessariamente são aqueles que
tipicamente regem uma economia de mercado.
264. A PetroVietnam (PVN) seria uma empresa 100% estatal, verticalizada, que
opera não só na exploração, produção e refino de petróleo, gás, petroquímica, fertilizantes,
mas também atua na cadeia de borracha sintética. Registra-se que a borracha sintética é
utilizada para a produção de pneus de moto, sendo derivada de produtos petroquímicos,
como o eritreno e estireno (vinilbenzeno).
265. Assim, a VRG e a PVN, ambas estatais, possuem participação relevante na
fabricação de borracha natural e nos insumos para a produção de borracha sintética no
Vietnã.
266. O relatório do USDoC abordou ainda as restrições ao investimento
estrangeiro direto no setor petrolífero no Vietnã:
"Additional Sector-Specific and Commercial Activity Laws and Restrictions.
Foreign investors in Vietnam face additional hurdles due to various sector-specific and
commercial activity laws, which impose distinct regulations and restrictions tailored to
particular industries. For instance, the new Law on Credit Institutions, No. 32/2024/QH15
governs foreign investment in the banking sector by capping foreign ownership and
requiring joint ventures with local partners. The Law on Petroleum, No. 12/2022/QH15 sets
certain restrictions and requirements for foreign investment in the oil and gas industry,
including mandatory partnerships with SOEs and restrictions on certain operational
activities. While these sector-specific restrictions aim to protect national interests and
ensure local control over critical sectors, they can significantly distort competition and limit
foreign investors' operational freedom". (grifo nosso)
267. Na mesma direção, USDoC no mesmo documento menciona que:
"The list of economic activities where SOEs are required to be wholly state
owned largely overlaps with the types of economic activities in Table 4.1 above. There are,
however, some notable exceptions including 'policyoriented credit for socio-economic
development;' 'high tech activities and large investments;' and petroleum exploration, mine
development, and oil and gas exploitation. Taken together, these lists are extensive, and it
is unclear why the GOVN requires high levels of state ownership in many of the economic
activities included. For example, the justification for state monopolies in publishing,
production of scientific films and information concerning ideological and cultural security,
high-tech activities, petroleum exploration, mine development, and oil and gas exploitation
is not clearly articulated. State ownership requirements in these industries and sectors
suggest that the GOVN plans to retain strategic control over them for the foreseeable
future". (grifo nosso)
268. No caso específico de exploração de petróleo e gás natural, a Table 4.1
indicada no excerto, cita quais as atividades econômicas sujeitas a 100% de propriedade
estatal. Cabe também mencionar que o preço do petróleo e do gás são alguns dos
produtos cujos preços são determinados pelo governo. Ainda sobre a PetroVietnam, o
USDoC no mesmo documento afirma que
Many of the SOEs in these industries are tightly controlled by the GOVN and
are used by the GOVN to pursue government objectives. This is true for PetroVietnam, the
largest oil and gas company in Vietnam, which is wholly owned by the CMSC and owns
many additional SOEs.
PetroVietnam's board of directors is made up of high-ranking CPV [Communist
Party of Vietnam] members. PetroVietnam and the SOEs under it have been called upon by
the GOVN in its promulgation of Resolution No. 184-NQ/DU dated February 15, 2022, on
implementing digital transformation at all subsidiaries of PetroVietnam to 2025, with
orientations to 2030 to pursue digital transformation objectives. According to the official
GOVN news agency website, digital transformation is a 'strategic task' of PetroVietnam and
'is expected to help the group uphold the leading role in the oil and gas industry,
contributing to successfully implementing the national digital transformation {program},
and building a digital society and digital government.' PetroVietnam and its subsidiary
companies have indeed been undertaking activities to digitize their businesses, and
PetroVietnam's gasoline production in turn was expected to exceed the level specified in
the resolution by 14 percent. (grifo nosso)
269. O relatório do USDoC também aponta distorções na formação dos preços
no mercado de gás natural. O órgão explica que existem bens e serviços sujeitos à
"valoração de preços", o que, muito embora não signifique necessariamente definição de
preços direta por parte do Estado, implica sujeição a políticas governamentais de controle
de preços diante de "flutuações anormais durante um dado período de tempo", conforme
definição da Vietnam's Law on Prices 2023.
270. No relatório da autoridade estadunidense, há tabela de nove produtos que
podem sofrer intervenção do governo. Na referida tabela, estão listados os produtos
acabados de gás ou gasolina e o gás liquefeito de petróleo (GLP). Entre as intervenções do
governo pode-se mencionar controle da oferta e demanda, incluindo a produção,
importação ou exportação do bem ou serviço, bem como a compra e venda da reserva
nacional, quando aplicável; b) medidas de caráter financeiro ou monetário;
estabelecimento de preços específicos, tetos, pisos ou faixas de preço, com base nas
características inerentes do bem ou serviço; d) medidas de apoio de preço; e) sujeição do
bem ou serviço a fundos de valoração de preços, etc.
271. No caso da eletricidade, o USDoC aponta que há elementos que indicariam
que o controle de preços é mais frequente no Vietnã do que em outros países
asiáticos:
"However, although many countries employ price controls, Vietnam has more
price controls in place than many Asian countries. Figure 5.5 below shows that Vietnam
scores below the Asia and Australasia average for price controls, indicating that they are
more pervasive in Vietnam compared to other Asian and Australasian countries".
272. Quanto aos preços praticados de eletricidade no Vietnã, o USDoC constata que:
"As described above, the GOVN regulates the prices of electricity in Vietnam.
According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, electricity prices in Vietnam 'remain heavily
regulated by the Vietnamese government.' The controlled electricity prices are at levels
that have caused EVN [Vietnam Eletricity], the SOE that supplies the majority of electricity
in Vietnam, to consistently lose large amounts of money. Although the GOVN has gradually
increased electricity prices in Vietnam, the price has not always kept up with inflation. One
study found that, during the period studied, which was from 2010 to 2016, Vietnam's
electricity prices actually declined in real (i.e., inflation adjusted) terms". (grifo nosso)
273. Ainda no mesmo documento do USDoC:
"The GOVN accounts for at least 87 percent of the electricity market. Much of
Vietnam's electricity production is accounted for by Electricity Vietnam (EVN), which is one
of the largest SEGs in Vietnam having many smaller SOEs under it and is wholly owned by
the GOVN. Fitch Ratings assesses the level of GOVN control over EVN as 'Very Strong' and
states that the GOVN appoints EVN's board of directors and senior management and
directs investments, and that EVN receives government guarantees, loans from state-
owned banks at preferential rates, project subsidies, and tax incentives. These government
supports are necessary to keep EVN afloat since the GOVN sets electricity prices in Vietnam
at levels that have caused EVN to consistently lose money". (grifo nosso)
274. Outro elemento de prova apresentado nos autos do processo a respeito
da presente análise diz respeito ao controle ou exercício de propriedade sobre os meios de
produção no setor de pneus de moto. A esse respeito, registra-se que a empresa
Casumina, fabricante de pneus para automóveis, caminhões, máquinas agrícolas e
motocicletas, conforme já destacado, ocupava o 61º lugar no ranking das maiores
produtoras mundiais de pneus em 2023, sendo a maior produtora no Vietnã. De acordo
com MarketScreener, em 2023, o governo vietnamita controlava 51% das ações da
empresa por meio de sua subsidiária integral Vietnam National Chemical Group
(Vinachem).
275. Já a empresa Danang, já mencionada e também fabricante de pneus para
automóveis, caminhões, motocicletas e bicicletas, aparecia na 65ª posição do ranking
mundial, sendo a segunda maior entre as fabricantes de pneus sediadas no Vietnã83. A
exemplo da Casumina, o Governo do Vietnã controla a empresa por meio da Vinachem,
detentora de 50% das ações da Danang.
276. Já a empresa Sao Vang Rubber Company, também produtora de pneus de
automóveis, caminhões, máquinas agrícolas e motocicletas, teria 36% de suas ações de
posse da Vinachem, enquanto a empresa Inoue Rubber Vietnam, igualmente produtora de
pneus para motocicletas e bicicletas, seria uma joint-venture entre a companhia japonesa
Inoue Rubber e a Vinachem (detentora de 24% das ações).
277. Quanto à participação de empresas estatais na economia vietnamita, o
USDoC constatou que:
"To fulfil the government objective of SOEs playing the leading role in the
economy, the GOVN created large conglomerations of SOEs that each fulfill a specific
government objective.
These SEGs [State Economic Groups] have been characterized as being the 'iron
fists of the state' and representing the 'commanding heights' of the economy. They
typically have monopoly or near-monopoly status in the industries in which they operate,
thereby inhibiting competition. Dominating entire industries allows the GOVN to target
them with industrial policies that are ostensibly intended to support an entire sector. This
allows SEGs to be granted preferential access to resources. Their monopoly positions also
allow them and their government owners to set the rules in those industries. In many
cases, SEGs and the government bodies that own them are tasked with drafting the
development plan and strategy for the entire industry. SEGs therefore do not operate on
market principles. Their size and scope of operations allows them to have significant and
widespread impact on the Vietnamese economy. There are nine SEGs in existence today in
Vietnam, which are listed in Table 4.8." (grifo nosso)
278. Em seguida, no mesmo documento o USDoC ressaltou que:
"While it is common for governments to have state ownership in certain areas
of the economy, including those providing public services, in most countries, private
enterprises dominate the manufacturing sector. For this reason, there is often a high
degree of competition in the manufacturing sector. The extent of state ownership and the
extent to which SOEs in this sector pursue government objectives is therefore particularly
important.
Although state ownership in Vietnam's manufacturing sector has declined
notably with SOE equitizations since 2010, it still has high levels of state ownership, with
446 SOEs total in this sector. Wholesale and retail trade of manufactured products also
have high levels of state ownership with 292 SOEs operating in this sector. Notably, SOEs
in the manufacturing sector make up the majority of the SOEs under the management
portfolio of the SCIC [Supervisory Board of State Capital Investment Corporation] (i.e., 75
out of the total 145 enterprises managed by the SCIC as of 2022). As noted, the SCIC is
tasked with strengthening the dominant role of the state in key sectors. The GOVN
therefore appears to view the manufacturing sector as a key industry in which it intends
to increase its control". (grifo nosso)
279. O estudo o USDoC abordou ainda a extensão da propriedade ou o controle
do governo sobre os meios de produção:
While GOVN statistics identify the size of the SOE sector to have declined from
40.0 percent of GDP in 2002 to a 20.6-30.2 percent range in recent years, Commerce
believes these statistics have understated SOEs' overall contributions to economic activity.
Specifically, accounting for indirect forms of SOE ownership and Vietnamese companies
with minority shares but controlled levels of government ownership would likely result in
higher estimates of state ownership. Greater transparency in the identification of SOEs'
output levels would also contribute to a more accurate, and likely higher, share of
government influence over economic activity in Vietnam.
Meanwhile, Vietnam's private sector, which accounted for almost half of GDP
according to the latest data, has not grown since 2002, in large part due to its limited
access to resources (e.g., capital). The void filled by the decline in the size of the SOE
sector is instead accounted for by foreign firms from such countries as Japan, South Korea,
and China. While the combination of these market-oriented developments has been
important, Vietnamese law still requires SOEs to play the leading role in its economy, and
benefits are still largely disproportionally bestowed upon state sector firms relative to their
private sector counterparts. As such, deeper structural reforms are needed before the
economy becomes deeply reliant upon free-forming supply and demand conditions.
Continued state ownership and control over land, an important means of
production, in Vietnam is an illustrative example of how the government dictates market
outcomes. Although the GOVN has marginally improved policies governing government
pricing and allocation of land-use rights, the government continues to own all land in
Vietnam and exercise significant control over its pricing and allocation. Individual land-use
rights remain limited and land users are often not able to sell their land-use rights or
convert the land for different uses. (grifo nosso)
280. Ainda, sobre a extensão do controle do governo sobre a alocação de
recursos e sobre as decisões de preço e produção das empresas:
According to Vietnamese statistics and Commerce estimates, GOVN ownership
in the banking sector has fallen from the 70 to 80 percent range in 2002 to at least 50
percent today, although the exact figure is unknown due to the lack of publicly available
information concerning joint-stock banks.
The GOVN has also reduced the number of price controls over commodities
since 2002. Despite these important market-oriented reforms, Commerce finds that
considerable resource allocation is still being conducted by the government, and that
extensive price controls have lingered since 2002. Moreover, the GOVN still heavily relies
on state planning as a means through which it directs business decisions to achieve output
and other economic outcomes. As benefits such as preferential lending practices are still
disproportionally bestowed upon state sector firms relative to their private sector
counterparts, deeper structural reforms are needed before resource, price, and output
determinations become principally driven by free-forming market conditions. (grifo
nosso)
281. O estudo apresentado pela ANIP destacou que os desempenhos
econômico-financeiros das empresas Casumina, Danang e Sao Vang seriam bastante
insatisfatórios pelo menos desde 2017. Especificamente em 2023, de acordo com a base de
dados da Bloomberg, as margens de lucro antes de juros, impostos, depreciação e
amortização (Lajida) daquelas empresas foram, respectivamente, de 8,1%, 8,8% e 5,7%, em
comparação a 21,0% para a Pirelli, 18,3% para Bridgestone e 16,1% para Michelin.
282. A comparação acima poderia indicar que se as condições de mercado
fossem prevalecentes, Casumina, Danang e Sao Vang provavelmente enfrentariam
processos de falência ou reestruturação e alegou que a sobrevivência daquelas empresas
estaria fortemente vinculada ao fato de ter a Vinachem como acionista relevante. Indo ao
encontro do entendimento da ANIP, o próprio USDoC mencionou características da
economia vietnamita com relação à falência de empresas estatais no Vietnã:
"Soft Budget Constraints and Bankruptcy. Unlike private enterprises, SOEs are
often not subject to hard budget constraints. Although SOEs are not legally protected from
bankruptcy, the soft budget constraints they are afforded usually protect them from
bankruptcy. The GOVN requires banks to continue to lend to SOEs despite their credit
history or unlikelihood of repayment, and, if the SOEs cannot repay the loans, either
restructure, eliminate, or transfer the NPLs [Non-Performing Loan] to other SOEs"
283. Outro ponto abordado pelo estudo da petição foi a presença dominante
de bancos estatais no sistema financeiro do Vietnã, a qual poderia ser considerada uma
importante distorção de mercado que afetaria a indústria de pneus do país.
284. Conforma já apontado, pelo menos 50% do sistema bancário no Vietnã é
composto de entidades estatais, com participação destacada pelo Banco do Estado do
Vietnã. Os principais bancos comerciais são estatais: Bank for Investment and Development
of Vietnam (BIDV), Joint Stock Commercial Bank for Foreign Trade of Vietnam
(Vietcombank), Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (Agribank); e Vietnam
Bank for Industry and Trade (VietinBank), usualmente denominados "Big 4".
285. Evidências apontariam que, além de os bancos estatais dominarem o
sistema bancário vietnamita, eles viriam fortalecendo ainda mais sua posição de liderança.
Os quatro maiores bancos estatais do Vietnã apresentaram no ano de 2023 crescimento
dos lucros, em média, de 10 a 19%, com destaque para o BIDV, com crescimento anual de
19,2%. O cenário positivo aparentemente não se estendeu a bancos privados, pois a
maioria destes, incluindo relevantes instituições bancárias, apresentou queda nos lucros.
286. O relatório do USDoC comenta que o setor bancário se encontra entre
aqueles que contam com restrições ao investimento estrangeiro direto:
"Restricted Commercial Activities and Sectors. In addition to the above 25
prohibited commercial activities and sectors, the Investment Law (2020) provides a
framework that includes 227 sectors and commercial activities subject to conditional
business investment, incorporating changes from the Investment Law (2020). This general
list includes sectors such as water sanitization and architectural services, reflecting evolving
national priorities, while sectors like franchising and logistics have been removed,
indicating a shift towards a more open investment environment. Additionally, Decree No.
31 lists 59 specific commercial activities (Table 3.2) within these 227 sectors where foreign
investment is allowed but subject to additional restrictions. These restricted activities
include critical sectors such as telecommunications, banking, and transportation, and often
involve conditions like foreign ownership limits, joint venture requirements with local
partners, and other regulatory constraints. These adjustments underscore the
government's efforts to balance national security and public welfare concerns with the goal
of attracting foreign investment." (grifo nosso)
287. O documento da autoridade estadunidense também tece comentário a
respeito da menor eficiência de bancos estatais relativa comparativamente aos bancos
privados e a determinação da taxa máxima de juros a ser praticada em certos tipos de
empréstimos:
"Commerce finds that state ownership in the banking sector appears to have
declined since Commerce's Vietnam NME Determination (2002), although the extent of the
decline is unknown. At least 50 percent of Vietnam's banking sector is accounted for by
majority state-owned banks, whereas in 2002 the banking sector was 70-80 percent state-
owned. Through state ownership, the GOVN continues to exercise significant control over
the banking sector. State-owned banks lend disproportionately to SOEs despite SOEs often
being less efficient than their private counterparts, which results in a misallocation of
resources. In addition, the GOVN continues to set maximum lending rates that banks are
required to follow for certain types of loans that are made, which may account for most
loans in Vietnam. Such cap-setting of interest rates precludes the option for certain rates
to effectively incorporate market-determined risk premia". (grifo nosso)
288. Os bancos privados têm autorização para operar no país, mas com
restrições de propriedade estrangeira de 5% para pessoas físicas, 15% para instituições e
30% para propriedade estrangeira em geral. O mesmo relatório do USDoC também ressalta
que os bancos estatais acabam privilegiando as empresas estatais na alocação de
crédito:
"As described above, state-owned banks account for at least half of Vietnam's
total banking sector assets. The OECD reported that, in practice, Vietnam's largest banks,
which are wholly or majority state owned, closely follow government directives. According
to the OECD, '...the country's largest banks are...state-owned and in terms of corporate
governance are almost treated as affiliates of the central bank.' This has implications for
credit allocations. Government control over banks' lending activities and financial resource
allocations are described below.