RESOLUÇÃO GECEX Nº 819, DE 1º DE DEZEMBRO DE 2025 (parte 9 de 15)

"The agriculture and agri-business sector has high levels of state ownership,
including all stages of agricultural production, with rice, coffee, and food processing
industries having particularly high levels of state ownership. The largest agriculture and
agri-food companies under the control of the Commission for the Management of State
Capital are: Vietnam Rubber Group (VRG), Vietnam National Coffee Corporation (Vinacafe),
Vietnam Northern Food Corporation (Vinafood-North), Vietnam Southern Food Corporation
(Vinafood-South), and Vietnam Forestry Corporation (Vinador). Most of these companies
have many companies under them. Many of these companies are export-oriented, and
together they pursue government objectives of revenue generation, employment, and
other economic, socioeconomic, and political goals of the GOVN.
For example, VRG has pursued the government objective of government
revenue generation and developing the industry. Concerning VRG, an article on a GOVN
news agency website states: "{a}s one of the backbones of Vietnam's agricultural industry,
rubber has been the focus of the government and related stakeholders. Like other
industries, the promotion as a national brand is meant to further push the crucial role the
industry has for the country. grifo nosso
289. Em outro trecho, o mesmo relatório ressalta que:
Many SOEs, whether equitized or not, state on their company websites that
they aim to fulfill the objectives of the government plans that are assigned to them. For
example, Vietnam Rubber Group's 2019 Annual Report states that its focus for the next
five years is 'to ensure the best fulfillment of its 2016-2020 plan that has been approved
by the Prime Minister.' Similarly, the development plans of Vietnam National Chemical
Group (Vinachem) for 2018 and 2019 mention compliance with GOVN industrial plans,
including the 2016-2020 SEDP [Socio-Economic Development Plan]. An article on
PetroVietnam's website states that its primary goal was to 'make its best efforts to over-
fulfill all targets and plans as assigned by the Government'. grifo nosso
290. Com base nos elementos apresentados, observa-se que a VRG atende
prioritariamente aos objetivos governamentais, que não necessariamente são aqueles que
tipicamente regem uma economia de mercado.
291. A PetroVietnam (PVN) seria uma empresa 100% estatal, verticalizada, que
opera não só na exploração, produção e refino de petróleo, gás, petroquímica,
fertilizantes, mas também atua na cadeia de borracha sintética. Registra-se que a borracha
sintética é utilizada para a produção de pneus de moto, sendo derivada de produtos
petroquímicos, como o eritreno e estireno (vinilbenzeno).
292. Assim, a VRG e a PVN, ambas estatais, possuem participação relevante na
fabricação de borracha natural e nos insumos para a produção de borracha sintética no
Vietnã.
293. O relatório do USDoC abordou ainda as restrições ao investimento
estrangeiro direto no setor petrolífero no Vietnã:
"Additional Sector-Specific and Commercial Activity Laws and Restrictions.
Foreign investors in Vietnam face additional hurdles due to various sector-specific and
commercial activity laws, which impose distinct regulations and restrictions tailored to
particular industries. For instance, the new Law on Credit Institutions, No. 32/2024/QH15
governs foreign investment in the banking sector by capping foreign ownership and
requiring joint ventures with local partners. The Law on Petroleum, No. 12/2022/QH15 sets
certain restrictions and requirements for foreign investment in the oil and gas industry,
including mandatory partnerships with SOEs and restrictions on certain operational
activities. While these sector-specific restrictions aim to protect national interests and
ensure local control over critical sectors, they can significantly distort competition and limit
foreign investors' operational freedom". (grifo nosso)
294. Na mesma direção, USDoC no mesmo documento menciona que:
"The list of economic activities where SOEs are required to be wholly state
owned largely overlaps with the types of economic activities in Table 4.1 above. There are,
however, some notable exceptions including 'policyoriented credit for socio-economic
development;' 'high tech activities and large investments;' and petroleum exploration,
mine development, and oil and gas exploitation. Taken together, these lists are extensive,
and it is unclear why the GOVN requires high levels of state ownership in many of the
economic activities included. For example, the justification for state monopolies in
publishing, production of scientific films and information concerning ideological and
cultural security, high-tech activities, petroleum exploration, mine development, and oil
and gas exploitation is not clearly articulated. State ownership requirements in these
industries and sectors suggest that the GOVN plans to retain strategic control over them
for the foreseeable future". (grifo nosso)
295. No caso específico de exploração de petróleo e gás natural, a Table 4.1
indicada no excerto, cita quais as atividades econômicas sujeitas a 100% de propriedade
estatal. Cabe também mencionar que o preço do petróleo e do gás são alguns dos
produtos cujos preços são determinados pelo governo. Ainda sobre a PetroVietnam, o
USDoC no mesmo documento afirma que
Many of the SOEs in these industries are tightly controlled by the GOVN and
are used by the GOVN to pursue government objectives. This is true for PetroVietnam, the
largest oil and gas company in Vietnam, which is wholly owned by the CMSC and owns
many additional SOEs.
PetroVietnam's board of directors is made up of high-ranking CPV [Communist
Party of Vietnam] members. PetroVietnam and the SOEs under it have been called upon
by the GOVN in its promulgation of Resolution No. 184-NQ/DU dated February 15, 2022,
on implementing digital transformation at all subsidiaries of PetroVietnam to 2025, with
orientations to 2030 to pursue digital transformation objectives. According to the official
GOVN news agency website, digital transformation is a 'strategic task' of PetroVietnam
and 'is expected to help the group uphold the leading role in the oil and gas industry,
contributing to successfully implementing the national digital transformation {program},
and building a digital society and digital government.' PetroVietnam and its subsidiary
companies have indeed been undertaking activities to digitize their businesses, and
PetroVietnam's gasoline production in turn was expected to exceed the level specified in
the resolution by 14 percent. (grifo nosso)
296. O relatório do USDoC também aponta distorções na formação dos preços
no mercado de gás natural. O órgão explica que existem bens e serviços sujeitos à
"valoração de preços", o que, muito embora não signifique necessariamente definição de
preços direta por parte do Estado, implica sujeição a políticas governamentais de controle
de preços diante de "flutuações anormais durante um dado período de tempo", conforme
definição da Vietnam's Law on Prices 2023 .
297. No relatório da autoridade estadunidense, há tabela de nove produtos que
podem sofrer intervenção do governo. Na referida tabela, estão listados os produtos
acabados de gás ou gasolina e o gás liquefeito de petróleo (GLP). Entre as intervenções do
governo pode-se mencionar controle da oferta e demanda, incluindo a produção, importação
ou exportação do bem ou serviço, bem como a compra e venda da reserva nacional, quando
aplicável; b) medidas de caráter financeiro ou monetário; estabelecimento de preços
específicos, tetos, pisos ou faixas de preço, com base nas características inerentes do bem ou
serviço; d) medidas de apoio de preço; e) sujeição do bem ou serviço a fundos de valoração
de preços, etc.
298. No caso da eletricidade, o USDoC aponta que há elementos que indicariam
que o controle de preços é mais frequente no Vietnã do que em outros países asiáticos:
"However, although many countries employ price controls, Vietnam has more
price controls in place than many Asian countries. Figure 5.5 below shows that Vietnam
scores below the Asia and Australasia average for price controls, indicating that they are
more pervasive in Vietnam compared to other Asian and Australasian countries".
299. Quanto aos preços praticados de eletricidade no Vietnã, o USDoC constata que:
As described above, the GOVN regulates the prices of electricity in Vietnam.
According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, electricity prices in Vietnam 'remain heavily
regulated by the Vietnamese government.' The controlled electricity prices are at levels
that have caused EVN [Vietnam Eletricity], the SOE that supplies the majority of electricity
in Vietnam, to consistently lose large amounts of money. Although the GOVN has
gradually increased electricity prices in Vietnam, the price has not always kept up with
inflation. One study found that, during the period studied, which was from 2010 to 2016,
Vietnam's electricity prices actually declined in real (i.e., inflation adjusted) terms. grifo
nosso
300. Ainda no mesmo documento do USDoC:
The GOVN accounts for at least 87 percent of the electricity market. Much of
Vietnam's electricity production is accounted for by Electricity Vietnam (EVN), which is one
of the largest SEGs in Vietnam having many smaller SOEs under it and is wholly owned by
the GOVN. Fitch Ratings assesses the level of GOVN control over EVN as 'Very Strong' and
states that the GOVN appoints EVN's board of directors and senior management and
directs investments, and that EVN receives government guarantees, loans from state-
owned banks at preferential rates, project subsidies, and tax incentives. These government
supports are necessary to keep EVN afloat since the GOVN sets electricity prices in
Vietnam at levels that have caused EVN to consistently lose money. grifo nosso
301. Outro elemento de prova apresentado nos autos do processo a respeito da
presente análise diz respeito ao controle ou exercício de propriedade sobre os meios de
produção no setor de pneus de moto. A esse respeito, registra-se que a empresa Casumina,
fabricante de pneus para automóveis, caminhões, máquinas agrícolas e motocicletas,
conforme já destacado, ocupava o 61º lugar no ranking das maiores produtoras mundiais de
pneus em 2023, sendo a maior produtora no Vietnã. De acordo com MarketScreener, em
2023, o governo vietnamita controlava 51% das ações da empresa por meio de sua subsidiária
integral Vietnam National Chemical Group (Vinachem).
302. Já a empresa Danang, já mencionada e também fabricante de pneus para
automóveis, caminhões, motocicletas e bicicletas, aparecia na 65ª posição do ranking
mundial, sendo a segunda maior entre as fabricantes de pneus sediadas no Vietnã83. A
exemplo da Casumina, o Governo do Vietnã controla a empresa por meio da Vinachem,
detentora de 50% das ações da Danang.
303. Já a empresa Sao Vang Rubber Company, também produtora de pneus de
automóveis, caminhões, máquinas agrícolas e motocicletas, teria 36% de suas ações de
posse da Vinachem, enquanto a empresa Inoue Rubber Vietnam, igualmente produtora de
pneus para motocicletas e bicicletas, seria uma joint-venture entre a companhia japonesa
Inoue Rubber e a Vinachem (detentora de 24% das ações).
304. Quanto à participação de empresas estatais na economia vietnamita, o
USDoC constatou que:
"To fulfil the government objective of SOEs playing the leading role in the
economy, the GOVN created large conglomerations of SOEs that each fulfill a specific
government objective.
These SEGs [State Economic Groups] have been characterized as being the 'iron
fists of the state' and representing the 'commanding heights' of the economy. They
typically have monopoly or near-monopoly status in the industries in which they operate,
thereby inhibiting competition. Dominating entire industries allows the GOVN to target
them with industrial policies that are ostensibly intended to support an entire sector. This
allows SEGs to be granted preferential access to resources. Their monopoly positions also
allow them and their government owners to set the rules in those industries. In many
cases, SEGs and the government bodies that own them are tasked with drafting the
development plan and strategy for the entire industry. SEGs therefore do not operate on
market principles. Their size and scope of operations allows them to have significant and
widespread impact on the Vietnamese economy. There are nine SEGs in existence today in
Vietnam, which are listed in Table 4.8." (grifo nosso)
305. Em seguida, no mesmo documento o USDoC ressaltou que:
"While it is common for governments to have state ownership in certain areas
of the economy, including those providing public services, in most countries, private
enterprises dominate the manufacturing sector. For this reason, there is often a high
degree of competition in the manufacturing sector. The extent of state ownership and the
extent to which SOEs in this sector pursue government objectives is therefore particularly
important.
Although state ownership in Vietnam's manufacturing sector has declined
notably with SOE equitizations since 2010, it still has high levels of state ownership, with
446 SOEs total in this sector. Wholesale and retail trade of manufactured products also
have high levels of state ownership with 292 SOEs operating in this sector. Notably, SOEs
in the manufacturing sector make up the majority of the SOEs under the management
portfolio of the SCIC [Supervisory Board of State Capital Investment Corporation] (i.e., 75
out of the total 145 enterprises managed by the SCIC as of 2022). As noted, the SCIC is
tasked with strengthening the dominant role of the state in key sectors. The GOVN
therefore appears to view the manufacturing sector as a key industry in which it intends
to increase its control. grifo nosso
306. O estudo o USDoC abordou ainda a extensão da propriedade ou o
controle do governo sobre os meios de produção:
While GOVN statistics identify the size of the SOE sector to have declined from
40.0 percent of GDP in 2002 to a 20.6-30.2 percent range in recent years, Commerce
believes these statistics have understated SOEs' overall contributions to economic activity.
Specifically, accounting for indirect forms of SOE ownership and Vietnamese companies
with minority shares but controlled levels of government ownership would likely result in
higher estimates of state ownership. Greater transparency in the identification of SOEs'
output levels would also contribute to a more accurate, and likely higher, share of
government influence over economic activity in Vietnam.
Meanwhile, Vietnam's private sector, which accounted for almost half of GDP
according to the latest data, has not grown since 2002, in large part due to its limited
access to resources (e.g., capital). The void filled by the decline in the size of the SOE
sector is instead accounted for by foreign firms from such countries as Japan, South Korea,
and China. While the combination of these market-oriented developments has been
important, Vietnamese law still requires SOEs to play the leading role in its economy, and
benefits are still largely disproportionally bestowed upon state sector firms relative to
their private sector counterparts. As such, deeper structural reforms are needed before
the economy becomes deeply reliant upon free-forming supply and demand conditions.
Continued state ownership and control over land, an important means of
production, in Vietnam is an illustrative example of how the government dictates market
outcomes. Although the GOVN has marginally improved policies governing government
pricing and allocation of land-use rights, the government continues to own all land in
Vietnam and exercise significant control over its pricing and allocation. Individual land-use
rights remain limited and land users are often not able to sell their land-use rights or
convert the land for different uses. (grifo nosso)
307. Ainda, sobre a extensão do controle do governo sobre a alocação de
recursos e sobre as decisões de preço e produção das empresas:
According to Vietnamese statistics and Commerce estimates, GOVN ownership
in the banking sector has fallen from the 70 to 80 percent range in 2002 to at least 50
percent today, although the exact figure is unknown due to the lack of publicly available
information concerning joint-stock banks.
The GOVN has also reduced the number of price controls over commodities
since 2002. Despite these important market-oriented reforms, Commerce finds that
considerable resource allocation is still being conducted by the government, and that
extensive price controls have lingered since 2002. Moreover, the GOVN still heavily relies
on state planning as a means through which it directs business decisions to achieve output
and other economic outcomes. As benefits such as preferential lending practices are still
disproportionally bestowed upon state sector firms relative to their private sector
counterparts, deeper structural reforms are needed before resource, price, and output
determinations become principally driven by free-forming market conditions. (grifo
nosso)
308. O estudo apresentado pela ANIP destacou que os desempenhos
econômico-financeiros das empresas Casumina, Danang e Sao Vang seriam bastante
insatisfatórios pelo menos desde 2017. Especificamente em 2023, de acordo com a base
de dados da Bloomberg, as margens de lucro antes de juros, impostos, depreciação e
amortização (Lajida) daquelas empresas foram, respectivamente, de 8,1%, 8,8% e 5,7%,
em comparação a 21,0% para a Pirelli, 18,3% para Bridgestone e 16,1% para Michelin.
309. A comparação acima poderia indicar que se as condições de mercado
fossem prevalecentes, Casumina, Danang e Sao Vang provavelmente enfrentariam
processos de falência ou reestruturação e alegou que a sobrevivência daquelas empresas
estaria fortemente vinculada ao fato de ter a Vinachem como acionista relevante. Indo ao
encontro do entendimento da ANIP, o próprio USDoC mencionou características da
economia vietnamita com relação à falência de empresas estatais no Vietnã:
"Soft Budget Constraints and Bankruptcy. Unlike private enterprises, SOEs are
often not subject to hard budget constraints. Although SOEs are not legally protected from
bankruptcy, the soft budget constraints they are afforded usually protect them from
bankruptcy. The GOVN requires banks to continue to lend to SOEs despite their credit
history or unlikelihood of repayment, and, if the SOEs cannot repay the loans, either
restructure, eliminate, or transfer the NPLs [Non-Performing Loan] to other SOEs"
310. Outro ponto abordado pelo estudo da petição foi a presença dominante
de bancos estatais no sistema financeiro do Vietnã, a qual poderia ser considerada uma
importante distorção de mercado que afetaria a indústria de pneus do país.
311. Conforma já apontado, pelo menos 50% do sistema bancário no Vietnã é
composto de entidades estatais, com participação destacada pelo Banco do Estado do
Vietnã. Os principais bancos comerciais são estatais: Bank for Investment and
Development of Vietnam (BIDV), Joint Stock Commercial Bank for Foreign Trade of
Vietnam (Vietcombank), Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (Agribank);
e Vietnam Bank for Industry and Trade (VietinBank), usualmente denominados "Big 4".
312. Evidências apontariam que, além de os bancos estatais dominarem o
sistema bancário vietnamita, eles viriam fortalecendo ainda mais sua posição de liderança.
Os quatro maiores bancos estatais do Vietnã apresentaram no ano de 2023 crescimento
dos lucros, em média, de 10 a 19%, com destaque para o BIDV, com crescimento anual de
19,2%. O cenário positivo aparentemente não se estendeu a bancos privados, pois a
maioria destes, incluindo relevantes instituições bancárias, apresentou queda nos lucros.
313. O relatório do USDoC comenta que o setor bancário se encontra entre
aqueles que contam com restrições ao investimento estrangeiro direto:
"Restricted Commercial Activities and Sectors. In addition to the above 25
prohibited commercial activities and sectors, the Investment Law (2020) provides a
framework that includes 227 sectors and commercial activities subject to conditional
business investment, incorporating changes from the Investment Law (2020). This general
list includes sectors such as water sanitization and architectural services, reflecting
evolving national priorities, while sectors like franchising and logistics have been removed,
indicating a shift towards a more open investment environment. Additionally, Decree No.
31 lists 59 specific commercial activities (Table 3.2) within these 227 sectors where foreign
investment is allowed but subject to additional restrictions. These restricted activities
include critical sectors such as telecommunications, banking, and transportation, and often
involve conditions like foreign ownership limits, joint venture requirements with local
partners, and other regulatory constraints. These adjustments underscore the
government's efforts to balance national security and public welfare concerns with the
goal of attracting foreign investment." (grifo nosso)
314. O documento da autoridade estadunidense também tece comentário a
respeito da menor eficiência de bancos estatais relativa comparativamente aos bancos
privados e a determinação da taxa máxima de juros a ser praticada em certos tipos de
empréstimos:
"Commerce finds that state ownership in the banking sector appears to have
declined since Commerce's Vietnam NME Determination (2002), although the extent of the
decline is unknown. At least 50 percent of Vietnam's banking sector is accounted for by
majority state-owned banks, whereas in 2002 the banking sector was 70-80 percent state-
owned. Through state ownership, the GOVN continues to exercise significant control over
the banking sector. State-owned banks lend disproportionately to SOEs despite SOEs often
being less efficient than their private counterparts, which results in a misallocation of
resources. In addition, the GOVN continues to set maximum lending rates that banks are
required to follow for certain types of loans that are made, which may account for most
loans in Vietnam. Such cap-setting of interest rates precludes the option for certain rates
to effectively incorporate market-determined risk premia". (grifo nosso)
315. Os bancos privados têm autorização para operar no país, mas com restrições
de propriedade estrangeira de 5% para pessoas físicas, 15% para instituições e 30% para
propriedade estrangeira em geral. O mesmo relatório do USDoC também ressalta que os
bancos estatais acabam privilegiando as empresas estatais na alocação de crédito:
"As described above, state-owned banks account for at least half of Vietnam's
total banking sector assets. The OECD reported that, in practice, Vietnam's largest banks,
which are wholly or majority state owned, closely follow government directives. According
to the OECD, '¼the country's largest banks are¼state-owned and in terms of corporate
governance are almost treated as affiliates of the central bank.' This has implications for
credit allocations. Government control over banks' lending activities and financial resource
allocations are described below.
Banks Lend Disproportionally to SOEs. Sources overwhelmingly find that SOEs
are allocated a large share of Vietnamese credit and on favorable terms compared to
private enterprises. According to the OECD, 'SOEs appropriate the lion's share of credit in
the economy.' The IMF found that 'SOEs obtain bank credit at lower cost on average even
after controlling for firm characteristics such as profitability and size,' and also that
'commercial banks keep lending to underperforming SOEs at artificially low lending rates.'
According to the OECD, 'Vietnamese SOEs are apparently able to borrow from commercial
banks on easy terms, either because the lenders are themselves state-owned or because
a state guarantee for the debtor is perceived.' Although its analysis is somewhat dated,
the World Bank similarly found that 'even the most profitable private firms do not even
try to get bank loans if they do not have connections because they will not likely be able
to. As underlying conditions have not changed, private firms are likely continuing this
practice.
316. O Decreto nº 986/QD-TTg, de 8 agosto de 2018, do Primeiro-Ministro da
República Socialista do Vietnã, que aprovou a Estratégia de Desenvolvimento do Setor
Bancário do Vietnã até 2025, com Orientações para 2030 (GOVN, 2018) é um indicativo do
modus operandi do sistema financeiro vietnamita. Além de estipular claramente que os
bancos estatais terão posição "dominante" no sistema financeiro, prevê a obrigatoriedade
de observação das "metas de desenvolvimento socioeconômicas" do governo. Ou seja, o
sistema financeiro vietnamita é arquitetado de forma a evitar que agentes externos ao
governo ganhem proeminência em tal mercado, para que os bancos e instituições
financeiras estatais sigam atuando em serviços da política de desenvolvimento nacional
estipulada pelo Governo do Vietnã.
317. Ademais, há indícios de que o governo vietnamita exerce significativo
controle sobre as transações com moedas estrangeiras, com influência direta e relevante
na taxa de câmbio, para favorecer suas exportações. Com efeito, a autoridade
investigadora dos Estados Unidos condenou o Vietnã por subsídios relacionados à
manipulação cambial em investigação encerrada em 2021.
318. Nesse sentido, o relatório do USDoC de 2024 aponta:
"Since Commerce's Vietnam NME Determination (2002), economic reforms in
Vietnam have led to enhanced currency convertibility and a general unwinding of
GOVN influence over the dong's valuation. This noteworthy progress has included
the GOVN's: assumption of IMF Article VIII obligations, which require full
convertibility of the current account; expansion of the trading band in which the
dong can be traded; overall reduction in intervention activity in the foreign exchange
market; and consideration of a broader set of economic variables when setting the
central exchange rate. While the dong is more responsive to market forces than it
was at the time of Commerce's Vietnam NME Determination (2002), and while
Vietnam was removed from the U.S. Department of Treasury's (Treasury's) list of
most egregious currency manipulators in 2022, the dong is still not freely
convertible. The GOVN continues to influence the value of its currency by intervening
in the foreign exchange market, and Vietnam's central bank, the SBV, is not
independent from the policy-making apparatus."
319. A interferência estatal sobre a organização dos trabalhadores e sindicatos
no Vietnã também foi outro argumento apresentado. Em 2021, entrou em vigor um novo
Código do Trabalho, a partir do qual foi autorizado, pela primeira vez, que trabalhadores
constituíssem Workers Organizations (WOs) independentes e não filiadas à Vietnam
General Confederation of Labor (VGCL). Entretanto, o raio de ação das WOs seria muito
limitado e seu formato, passível de críticas no debate internacional, de acordo com
Humans Right Watch (HRW):
Chapter 13 of Vietnam's 2021 labor code provides for 'enterprise-level worker
organizations,' and its Trade Union Law provides for 'trade unions' as well as 'worker
representative organizations,' a term that appears in both laws. However, Vietnam's Trade
Union Law only allows government-controlled 'unions'. The labor code still requires
implementing regulations to be issued for the law to go into force. And no enterprise-level
worker representative organizations exist in Vietnam. grifo nosso
320. Também segundo Joe Buckley, especialista em política trabalhista
vietnamita, as WOs:
"They are not unions. WOs are only allowed to be formed at the individual
enterprise level and are more limited in what they can do compared to unions. Unions, on
the other hand, are part of the VGCL and therefore embedded in the countrywide
structures of the Confederation. There are separate laws regulating each type of
organization; the Trade Union Law regulates unions, while WOs fall under one chapter of
the 2019 Labor Code."
321. Sendo assim, ainda que haja a iniciativa de criar as WOs como novas
formas de organização laborais, o governo do Vietnã continua a denominar a VGCL,
liderada e com membros indicados pelo governo, como uma "confederação do trabalho"
de "federações do trabalho" a nível empresarial, conforme entendimento da HRW.
322. Aprovada em julho de 2023, a Diretiva 24 tem como objetivo aprimorar
e normatizar o controle do governo sobre a implementação de novas leis laborais. A HRW
menciona que a referida diretiva faz referência à proibição de funcionamento de
sindicatos independentes no país e afirma que todos os sindicatos devem ser afiliados ao
governo e ao Partido Comunista do Vietnã:
"The directive references orders that prohibit independent labor unions from
operating in Vietnam, and states that all unions must be affiliated with the government
and Communist Party of Vietnam".
323. Ainda conforme a HRW:
"It's patently false to claim that Vietnamese workers can organize unions or
that their wages are the result of free bargaining between labor and management," said
John Sifton, Asia advocacy director at Human Rights Watch. "Not a single independent
union exists in Vietnam and no working legal frameworks exist for unions to be created
or for workers to enforce labor rights."
324. Na mesma toada, o relatório do USDoC aponta que:
Vietnam has introduced notable labor law reforms over the past 20 years, such
as the enactment of the Labor Code, No. 45/2019/QH14 (Vietnam Labor Code (2019)),
which has helped enhance worker protections and promote fairer labor practices.
Importantly, the Vietnam Labor Code (2019) has legalized not only the formation of labor
unions but the rights of those unions to bargain collectively. Despite the GOVN's legal
reforms in this area, Vietnam's labor market does not reflect free bargaining between
labor and management. Labor unions that are truly independent from the GOVN are
illegal in Vietnam. The state-controlled Vietnam General Confederation of Labor (VGCL)
and its affiliates are the only labor organizations in existence in Vietnam. In addition,
strikes are generally illegal in Vietnam and the country's dispute resolution system does
not effectively address labor conflicts and grievances. All of these issues have
compromised the ability of workers to organize and bargain collectively for higher wages.
grifo nosso
325. Adicionalmente, a peticionária trouxe a análise de empresas que atuam
no setor de pneus vietnamita, com o intuito de avaliar em que medida suas operações se
aproximariam ou não das condições típicas de mercado. Cabe mencionar que há
elementos que indicam que produtoras/exportadoras de pneu de moto têm recebido
subsídios do Governo do Vietnã.